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To understand why the late 1960s saw the birth of a social movement
able to shake the apartheid regime, it is necessary to take a new look at
black politics in South Africa before 1965. Liberal accounts have described
it as the triumphal advance of modern nationalism, while Marxist versions
have presented it as the unfolding of the contradictions of a modern
industrial economy and economic structure. Neither takes seriously the
political and social lives of black communities or the semi-developed
character of the South African state.1 Indeed,they have all but ignored the
hybrid structures and complex compromises that immobilized elites, the
local networks for the control and mobilisation of the masses, or the
parochial communications and identities that restricted the capacity to
imagine political transformation, much less attain it.
This chapter will therefore look at the workings of the state and the
nature of opposition movements in black communities, focusing on 1945 to
1965. It will successively consider state-society relations, the values and
practices of organized opposition, the prevalent patterns of political culture,
and the dynamics of collective action which they produced. The result is an
image of black politics in South Africa quite different from previous
structuralist accounts.
The argument here is that black politics before 1965 centered on the
exercise of patrimonial power in black communities. The South African
state had a weak center and strong periphery, where the lines between
public and private were blurred in local networks of influence. These
networks formed part of the active, complex social and political life of black
communities, in which local elites wielded power through webs of clientelist
relations. Cliques within the elites competed through these networks, based
on control over resources and decisions in local government and civil
society. But power also flowed from below, through the networks ordinary
people established in their neighborhoods, hostels, and workplaces to get on
with and make sense of their lives. Their members constantly negotiated
with the elite over interests and identities. The professional middle classes,
for their part, had corporatist bodies, which increasingly identified with
popular causes. The whole set of personalized and particularist
::..;„• relationships was underpinned by the narrow character of the public sphere,
. , r •;, in which only a small, literate minority participated fully.
, r Organized opposition, principally the African National Congress
;.i (ANC), was marked by the same relationships and culture influencing the
;-, ,-< local state. With opposition politics only a small part of community life,
.;.;.;.-;-. even members of resistance groups stood in an ambiguous relation to
, authority, frequently participating in government-created institutions. Asa
I whole, black political-culture was fragmentary, assimilationist, and parochial,
and marked by race, class, and ethnicity, with a weak sense of national
identity. In this setting, although the socio-political order was undemocratic
and repressive, it possessed significant legitimacy, both indirectly through the
followings of local leaders and directly through the acceptance of Western
values. Even resistance often mobilized through collaborative channels and
patrimonial networks. This approach draws on writers on social movements
in semi-industrialized societies who explain collective action through
community and identity more than interest or structure.2
vThis description, and its underlying premises, contrasts with the images
prevailing in the literature on black political society. The South African
state is portrayed as a strong, modern bureauciacy, coherently implementing
,~s; policy. Administration takes the place of politics. The foundations of
power are institutional: state and economic structures and the class
composition of black communities. Scant attention is paid local socio-
political life, because local elites are seen as powerless puppets without
- influence or popularity. The black masses are acted upon, by organizations
and structures, rather than actors, while the middle classes, capable of
choice, are viewed with suspicion as "petit-bourgeois nationalists" and
potential sellouts to popular struggle. The only organizations worth analysis
are resistance groups, seen as having no serious competition in black
communities. Indeed, resistance and collaboration politics are often treated
as entities in opposition, retrojecting the 1980s into the 1950s. Political
culture is largely ignored. The state is assumed to have had no legitimacy,
and grievances are assumed to lead to action in the absence of structural
barriers or penalties.
More generally, this chapter is intended to begin to re-politicize our
understanding of the workings of authoritarian states and of change within
them. States which are merely repressive have been confused with states
which are strong (in the sense of possessing autonomy or commanding
consensus). Discussions of authoritarian regimes tend to treat politics as
absent, when it just takes refuge in civil society. The existence of sources
of power within subordinate groups, competition within subordinate elites,
or their continual (if unequal) bargaining with dominant elites, also usually
escapes notice. The same holds for the sources of power from below that
reside in the organization of daily life, involving a mixture of acceptance,
negotiation, and resistance. Finally, there is the dynamism of social and
political movements when they, for a time, connect with the dynamism of
civil society. By analyzing the political resources available to regimes and
oppositions in this way, it becomes possible to understand the ambiguities
that restrict challenges to a regime and a society's capacity or self-
transformation. It also will allow us to discover in succeeding chapters how
changes in the underlying parameters can make possible mass mobilization
and regime crisis.
I. BLURRED BOUNDARIES: PUBLIC AUTHORITY, PRIVATE POWER,
AND PATRIMONIAL RELATIONS
The overlap of public and private power shaped the social life of
postwar black South Africa. It was founded upon linkages between
traditional social relations and those of the capitalist economy and colonial
state. The expansion of capitalist relations and state authority allowed the
extension of patrimonial forms of relations with new resources. This was
the origin of the clientelist state in South Africa, as in other Third World
societies, where a weak center is linked to the periphery via local
middlemen. Despite black elites' exclusion from the central political system,
positions of influence in the local state and civil society provided bases for
patronage power, in their communities. Of course, the existence of such
local power structures did not negate racial discrimination at the national
level, which the apartheid laws tightened after 1948. Yet neither did an
authoritarian racial oligarchy obliterate the vitality of black communities,
expressed through formally "apolitical" institutions as well as official bodies.
Rather, at the local level the South African state was to a considerable
extent colonized by a strong black civil society, a relationship that let it
function and enjoy some legitimacy. :
By 1945, black South Africa was a complex, highly networked society
in which the line between public and private relations was blurry indeed.
Ties of family, kin, neighborhood, and ethnicity held wide sway. In the
bantustans (tribal reserves), where two-thirds (check) of the African
population lived, chiefs and headmen possessed economic, political, judicial,
anc} religious power. In the industrializing towns, where most Africans were
temporary migrant workers or* newcomers, homeboy networks linked them
to their distant hoihes; while those settled in town formed new bonds with
neighbors and workmates without forgetting older loyalties.3 Squatter
camps, mushrooming as the the crowded "townships" reserved for Africans
overflowed, were led by men who claimed chief-like powers over their
residents. In the permanent urban black neighborhoods, aa intertwined
elite controlled political, religious, sporting, youth, women's, and welfare
groups, whose fpllowings often overlapped. Observing this situation in a
township outside Durban, the country's second-largest city, Magubane
commented that "the line between the political and the non-political is not
easily drawn."4
Historically, the overlap between the public and private spheres in
South Africa originated in the articulation of market and pre-capitalist
social relations under a colonial regime of indirect ruie. Conquest, taxation,
competition, and conversion knitted together the capitalist and lineage
orders. Chiefs and male elders dominated pre-colonial domestic or lineage
society ~ the economy of the extended family. They received the product
and obedience of women and young men in return for land, mates, and
ancestral wisdom.5 Larger clan and ethnic units were composed of
pyramids of lineage segments. After white settlers conquered the South
African interior during the nineteenth century, this way of Me largely
persisted in the reserves, though growing numbers of Africans worked on
white farms. With the establishment of the world's greatest diamond and
gold mines in the late 19th century, and surges of growth during the World
Wars and Depression that pushed manufacturing ahead of mining, South
Africa developed a semi-industrialized economy, on a par with Brazil or
Argentina. As this occurred, labor for industry came to dominate the
productive lives of Africans, when taxation and overcrowding pushed men
out of increasingly impoverished reserves to the mines and factories. But
their reproduction remained organized on lineage-type lines, even though
new resources were being distributed through extended and redefined
networks. In addition, Christianity became an important on the spiritual
lives of communities formerly dedicated to ancestor worship.
The extension of lineage-type networks with industrialization expanded
the nexus between public and private power, as did their absorption into the
state and through indirect rule. Most laborers' families remained in the
reserves (13% of the land). They became ipcreasingly dependent on wages
remitted from town while living under chiefs holding administrative as well
as ritual positions.6 Migrants to town re-established the familiar rural order
through homeboy networks, while chiefs' relatives were prominent in the
new urban middle class, since they could afford secondary schooling. Town
dwellers sought houses, jobs, and other favors from such township "big men"
with the ear of state or church authorities. ;As apartheid was implemented,
the Africanization of township and bantustan bureaucracies extended the
reach of their networks. Moreover, since most blacks were denied the
parliamentary franchise, political competition among them was largely
displaced into local, often formally private, arenas. Consequently, an elite
of male elders, chiefs, and members of the middle class came to allocate
both traditional means of subsistence and modern largesse on patrimonial
lines. (In such relations, kinship could be real, fictitious, or metaphorical,
as in the case of ethnic, religious, and neighborhood groups). As Bayart
notes, far from disappearing as industry and cities grew, capitalism's
expansion led to the expanded reproduction of lineage-type relations.7
As in other Third World societies, the networks linking public and
private made South Africa a clientelist state: one in which clientelism was
the principal means of administration, participation, and legitimation. In
clientelist relations, personal dependency is based on the exchange of goods
or protection from the patron for obedience or labor from a client
connected by ascription or affection.8 In a poor, unequal state, the meagre
resources left subordinate groups and the state's limited institutional
capacity oblige it to deal with dominated groups via local-level elites who
play the role of brokers between the center and their clienteles. Thus,
Hofmeyr writes that in rural South Africa, "the Native Affairs Department
could never properly institute the full exercise of depersonalized and distant
control that a centralized, literate bureaucracy implies. The areas to be
controlled were simply too huge, the people in these areas too numerous
and too unwilling to be governed." Inevitably, chiefs and headmen
possessed considerable power. Even in the townships, administration
worked not just by laws and regulations but by informal understandings,
often contrary to the rules. (For example, the brewing or use of alcoholic
drinks was banned, but tolerated.) The discretion of white officials was thus
considerable, providing leverage to black elite members with influence over
them.9
A clientelist state is a "soft state," with a weak center and strong
periphery, reflecting a balance of authority favoring local patrons over a
centralized, rule-governed bureaucracy.10 The power of middlemen resides
in their control over resource allocation at local level, making them
indispensible to their communities and the state. They describe their
relation to their clients through traditionalist discourses (in Africa, in
lineage-type terms) and their clients respond in kind seeking their help
(accepting degrees their claims to varying degrees). Such a state, based on
paternalism, reciprocity, and redistribution, recalls Weber's idea of the
"patrimonial state".11 Individuals' ties to the state derive indirectly from
their positions as clients of their patrons, rather than directly as citizens.
Political loyalty and participation is based on clan, tribe, area, or patron.
Legitimation occurs through these subordinated social relations as much or
more as through discourses of modernity and capitalism (freedom and equal
exchange). To survive, weak states need strong foundations in civil society
giving local elites bargaining power with the state.12
Yet while the roots of clientelism lay in civil society, the political
positions black South Africans held, though subordinate, influenced the
allocation of goods and the exercise of discretion enough to be power
sources. In the reserves, chiefs, headmen, and councils of male household
heads combined local economic, political, judicial, and religious authority.13
They distributed land, increasingly scarce, enforced laws (or allowed
violations), and decided disputes. They also rendered important services:
aid in getting pension or disability payments, permission to seek work in
town, or help for young men to obtain lobbla (bridewealth) and marry
according to custom. Religious roles included sacrifices and other rituals to
the ancestors, who had the clan's land, and sometimes witchcraft, too. Many
chiefs were well-liked, but there was no mistaking the dependency of their
subordinates. Kotze noted, "The structure of traditional social norms arid
patterns of behavior is still widely applied in tribal areas, and the chief, who
is at the apex of this structure, still exercises large influence."14
Official township political institutions were modernized analogs of the
patrimonial forms of rural society." Mimicking traditional institutions,
Advisory Boards consisted of older, well-off men, elected by township
leaseholders (male household heads).16 Like urban headmen, the boards
allocated resources vital to residents: houses (in short supply), trading sites
(the sole legal business premises), secondary school bursaries (gateways to
the middle class) and access to municipal sport grounds (the only sites for
clubs to play).17 They also helped residents negotiate the maze of over 100
permits and rules imposed by the white authorities* including those requiring
passes (internal passports granting the right to live in town), and lodgers
permits. They could urge officials to tolerate or crack down on shebeens
(illegal speakeasies) or home brewing of corn beer (migrant workers'
preferred drink). They could report or ignore rent defaulters, numerous in
poor communities. From the late 1940s, the ABs organized "civic guards"
(anti-crime vigilantes). Most white local governments required residents to
submit complaints and requests via the Boards, making them the sold
channel for their concerns. And they advised the white councils on
township development and rules. Studies of Advisory Boards termed them
"brokers" and "go-betweens," the language of the literature on clientelism.18
Baines' work on Port Elizabeth made the point explicitly: "The highly
personalized nature of administration of New Brighton facilitated the
operation of a system of patronage and clientelism for the Advisory Board
and their supporters."19
Local black elites could thus dispense patronage, despite their limited
formal power, because they had influence. In rural areas, Mayer noted,
"Much of the day-to-day administration ... fell to the headmen and sub-
headmen, who tended to rely on the support of influential elders in their
area." Much the same was true in urban areas. Atkinson reported.'that in
East London, "board members could significantly influence the fate'of black
residents by offering advice to white officials." Coertze recounts that in
Atteridgeville, outside Pretoria, applications for housing arid trading sites
were screened by AB members, then rubber-stamped by white officials. Nor
were these cases unusual: Reyburn describes similar ones in Germiston,
Benoni, and Springs, as well as Pretoria.20
Of course, although black South Africans possessed some power, they
were still oppressed, for whites had exclusive control of the central state and
capital. After the National Party (NP) won the 1948 white election, racial
segregation was tightened under its policy of apartheid. The NP was then
supported almost exclusively by Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch settlers
who formed three-fifths of the white population. Its base, predominantly
white farmers, workers, and fledgling capitalists who shared their hostility
to blacks, differed sharply in class and ethnic terms with that of the outgoing
United Party (UP). The UP largely represented the less overtly racist
English speaking minority of whites, including the bulk of the middle classes,
and leading mining and manufacturing interests.21 NP discourse was
marked by a crude white supremacism, contrasting with the UP's more
urban segregationism.
" I n the late 1940s and 1950s, the NP government passed laws to tighten
segregation, ensure a supply of cheap, unskilled black labor, despoil the
8black middle classes, and control dissent. Apartheid's pillars included the
Population Registration Act, which required a record of every citizen's race,
and the Immorality and the Mixed Marriages Acts, which extended bans on
whites having sex with or marrying Africans to colouieds and Indians as
well. The Group Areas Act required each race to live and trade in separate
areas and mandated removal of blacks from "white" areas. The "pass" laws,
requiring African men to have internal passports stamped with approval
before moving to town, were also applied to African women, extended to
more cities, and enforced more strictly. Under the Bantu Education Act,
the state took over the mission schools, the main source of education for
Africans, expanding schooling but lowering standards. "Betterment" schemes
to control overstocking in the reserves cost peasants cattle, needed for
plowing and lobola, while restrictions on black businesses, artisans, and
professionals in the cities grew. The parliamentary franchise of better-off
coloured men on the white voters' roll, and the separate roll letting middle-
class African men elect two members of Parliament, were abolished. The
Suppression of Communism Act outlawed the Communist Party and let
government restrict individuals and publications. The policies of
discrimination, dispossession, and disfranchisement applied against the black
four-fifths of the population deepened poverty, restricted social mobility,
made official harassment a daily nightmare, and perpetuated a rigid political
order more like a colony than an industrializing state. All this could not be
effectively opposed by black South Africans in official political structures.
Nonetheless, despite their exclusion from the central state and the
expansion of discrimination, black South Africans were not "powerless," even
under the apartheid regime. The situation of South Africa's black elite was
like that of the subordinate black elite in Hunter's "Regional City" (Atlanta),
a fairly weak interest relative to the dominant white group, yet in a position
of strength in its own community.22 In black communities, the local state
thus represented both an object whose resources existing cliques coveted
and a set of positions of power and influence allowing the formation or
reinforcement of networks. By privatizing bits of public authority, black
notables complemented the sources of power open in civil society and
formed power bases at local level.
n. BETWEEN COMPROMISE AND RESISTANCE: CLIENTELISM
AND CORPORATISM IN BLACK COMMUNITIES
In; the "context of clientelism, political and social life in black
communities-in the 1940s and 1950s looked largely inwards, centering on
factional competition within local' elites more than the struggle between
black and white; Black politics was usually not oppositional; rather it
involved wbrkiSffi within state-established channels and civil society. It was
based on the s6cial networks linking leaders and followers, through which
support Was organized, interests expressed, and identities defined. In
machine fashion, elites drew support frorri Clienteles, drawing on both public
and private resources. These relationshipfs generated loyalty as well as
support when the elite identified with the social networks that the rank and
file had constituted in their own lives'. The politics of the small but growing
professional section of the black middle class contrasted, however! "They,
too, sought to privatize public power, but through corporate claims to
equality, whose denial by apartheid encouraged them to identify with the
nationalist cause. In general, the era was marked by a politics of ambiguity
and unstable alliances, involving compromise more often than confrontation,
focusing more on bread and butter issues than abstract legal principles.
The black elite's mediating role was established through various inter-
racial relationships, but apartheid put these accommodations under growing
strain. The"bonds in the color bar," as Gluckma'n called them, included the
economy, Christianity, schooling, friendship, and political alliance.23 After
1948, the tightening of segregation and total exclusionof blacks from the
central state'frayed many of the links between white and black elites.
Understandings gave way to bitterness among black notables arid
professionals1; r(Pr°phet*calh/> Gluckman wrote, "If these sorts of links are
eliminated, black will deal with white only as authoritarian ruler and
employer, always as an enemy, and never as an ally.")24
Yet the networks honeycombing black communities were not simple
instruments of domination from above. Crossing older values with new
resources produced syncretic political relations and language, through which
both elites and masses understood themselves. Beinart describes this in the
rural areas:
"Chieftaincy provided the kind of institution and set of symbols behind
which rural people could unite at a local level and stake claims to
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land and communal rights. Such political and social expressions were
of course traditionalist, rather than 'traditional,' their content was
constantly shifting. Although rural consciousness took some of its
referents from the past, it was shaped by, and sensitive to the new
context of colonial rule and administration."25
The same held for the urban elite. The result was to put black elites in an
ambiguous position, permanently between compromise with and resistance
to the white authorities. The consequence was an ever-shifting set of
coalitions among sections of the elite, the black masses, and the
administration.26
Within black communities, political conflict was both shaped and
moderated by the interlocking nature and shared backgrounds of the black
elite. Studies show that a small upper middle class of businessmen,
ministers, politicians, nurses, and independent professionals dominated
township organizational life. The same people often led political groups as
well as sporting, church, educational, and welfare organizations, the key
groups in civil society.27 For instance, Magubane presents a table
displaying the links and organizational affiliations among Durban's African
elite. Of 31 executive members of the Durban and District African Football
Association, 14 sat on the local Advisory Board, 6 were active in the ANC
(including its future President, Albert Luthuli) and 3 of them sat on the AB,
6 belonged to school committees, 2 were leaders of teachers' unions, and 4
were in other local organizations.28 A typical middle-class leader
mentioned by Pauw, Mr. X of East London, was a member of the Advisory
Board and the school committee, an official of two sports clubs, a regular
churchgoer, and had close friends in both the local ANC and the local
chiefs court.29 (Among the Indian elite, Kuper reported members could
play the role of "sponsors" or "patrons" in as many as 20 associations.30)
The strong links within the black elite reflected a variety of connections.
These included social ties, common backgrounds and schooling, and
ethnicity, as well as organizational, professional, and religious
associations.31 Family and social connections also linked the rural and
urban elites. "Nowhere was there a major clash between the tribal and
educated elite," wrote Mayer of the Transkei. "What was typical were the
various forms of alliances between them in the various districts."32
While black-white tensions were present in the background, organized
political life in black communities turned on factional competition within
the local elite. -Research on urban black communities documents how
associational life was riven with conflict between middle class cliques.
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Nyquist writes of "intense competition within voluntary associations among
members of the upper stratum." Of 42 clubs.he studied during a year in
Grahamstown, four collapsed due to factional clashes, while two-thirds of
the rest suffered serious internal conflict.33 Factional divisions were usually
based on personal bonds and competition for resources, not political
lines.34 In New Brighton township society, for example, the dominant force
was a set of leaders active in the AB, the ANC, and the local Rugby Board.
Personal rivalries led to a breakaway from the Rugby Board in 1956-58,
healed only after the AB chair intervened.35
The popular bases for elite competition were constructed upon
patronage relations, although these ties were neo-traditional rather than
strictly traditional. Though membership in the dominant group was based
upon middle class position as well as traditional criteria of age, gender, and
lineage, those on the bottom included workers, the poor, and squatters as
well as women, younger men, and commoners. Moreover, status was not
linked just to occupation but to participation in communal and
redistributive activities.36 While older forms governed the seeking of
favors, the substance of such transactions involved the resources of the local
state and organizations in civil society under the control of local elites. Yet
the relations often were not the simple purchase of support; ties of clientage
were also associated with genuine and even enthusiastic followings when
they connected with the neighborhood networks residents had forged in
everyday life. Examples included James "Sofasonke" Mpanza, beloved in
Soweto from his rise as a squatter leader in the 1940s to his death in 1970,
and George Thabe, Sharpeville's political and football supremo.37
The most detailed study of the workings of township patronage and
political institutions in this era is Coertze's work on Atteridgeville. He
found that the most common patronage practice was promising houses for
AB votes.38 Supporters of opposing factions were also rewarded or
punished through the allocation of beer brewing permits, vital income
sources. (Housewives were asked, "Why did you vote for fools? You must
promise now that you will vote for us next time, otherwise we shall not give
you the recommendation paper" for beer brewing.) Shopkeepers supporting
one group witheld scarce goods from opponents' supporters at election time,
giving their own free sugar and corn. The differing factions had their own
burial societies, youth clubs, and women's associations. Intimidation also
played a part: civic guards, appointed ! among supporters of the AB
members, were accused of harsh action against backers of the "outs."39 The
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effect of the various types of power AB members had was described by an
interviewee:
, "What the resident knows to be a fact is that it does not matter what
reasonable request he may have to make from the Administration.
If he is not 'in' with the Board, his case never receives consideration.
Board members get anything they want in the nature of houses for
themselves and their friends and relatives and followers."40
Turnouts in Advisory Board elections were generally not very high,
reflecting the low-participation, clique-based nature of the institution. In
Atteridgeville, around 30% of eligible householders voted in elections for
the Advisory Board in the early 1950s. Turnout jumped to 65% in 1955 and
79% later in the decade when elections were fought on contentious local
issues.41 Similar levels of participation were reported on the East Rand.
In the big cities with the largest politicized African middle classes -
Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth,- turnout ran 10% or less,
though there, too, hot local issues could push it up.42 Support was the
result of personal ties to candidates.43 But clienteles stretched well beyond
the few qualified to vote for the AB, including household members and
those linked to the elite by other ties. (Thus, in Port Elizabeth and on the
East Rand, Advisory Board members chaired political bodies for those who
could not vote for ABs.44)
Sports clubs, the organizations with the largest followings (after
churches) in black communities, illustrate how township patronge reached
beyond the AB electorate into civil society. "Big men" of the community
elite linked sport, patronage, and politics. The middle-class "patron-
managers" funded clubs, offered transport, and obtained grounds, receiving
in return a retinue of muscular young men, neighborhood prestige, and
political support. Club members also helped players find jobs, board, and
lodging. Thus, in Port Elizabeth:
"Sport clubs centered around members of the middle-class township
elite, particularly Advisory Board members. These men had resources
~ economic, political, and prestige .-- to help the clubs. In turn they
benefitted from their ties. They were influential, respected figures,
both for their power and their sporting prowess in their younger
days, despite the fact that there were low turnouts in AB elections."45
The same principle applied to other bodies, including religious,
educational.and welfare groups.
The key to the strength of elite networks lay in their connections to
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neighborhood networks of relationships in daily life. Within each area,
intense, personal relations emerged from street life. As Jeffrey puts it:
"'Township dwellers in South Africa; residing in identical 'matchbox'
houses, on tiny plots of land, have been forced to spend a good deal
of their daily lives in the dusty streets. Children begin playing in the
streets from a very young age. Football matches and games of
hopscotch are regular occurrences. Adults traverse the streets on
their way to and from bus shelters and taxi ranks, visiting friends and
relatives, and going to church services and football matches.
Township street life has always been both vibrant and culturally
important."4*
Neighborhood cohesion was reinforced by the tendency of people of the
same clan, ethnic, linguistic, or religious group to settle near each other.47
Urban youth had their own area networks, based upon school for the
educated minority and neighborhood gangs for the majority of adolescent
drop-outs.48
How these neighborhood networks linked up with elite networks can
again be seen through the case of sport. The best players in several streets
would form a team, manifesting area rivalry. These teams were rooted in
their areas as both neighbors and representatives, bringing prestige to their
area as well as themselves.49 Frequently they also had a tribal or regional
coloration, reflecting the common origin of team members.50 They would
seek out the aid of a well-heeled local patron. The result was networks
united by shared identity and dependency on members of the local elite, in
personal, informal relationships.
In contrast to the clientelist links between notables and the masses,
during the 1940s and 1950s the growing professional strata of the black
middle classes advanced aggressively modern, corporatist claims.
Urbanization, industrialization, and popular struggles led to the
bureaucratization of the reproduction of the fast-growing African
proletariat, as state intervention in education, health, housing, and welfare
increased. Within the large institutions that resulted, the numbers and
hierarchy of African professionals increased, while their discretion and
influence declined. (As one-roomed schoolhouses gave way to large
educational institutions with sizeable staffs, the status of ordinary teachers
sank, while only principals and senior teachers remained notables.) The
new African petite bourgeoisie justified its status-seeking through its
collective function in the community, based on training and knowledge,
rather than individual patronage, for which its members usually lacked
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means.51 Educated and articulate, some younger members of this group,
especially teachers, made up for their lack of social standing with intellectual
vision and political activism. They formulated the Africanist vision: a
society reirivijgoia'fe'd toy a synthesis of modernity and tradition they would
realize. They^^also advanced vigorous professional claims. Black
professionals' saTanes had been cut during the Depression and squeezed by
inflation during' and after World War n, while large classes, poor facilities,
and white control alsd produced frustration. The result was a corporate
willingness to fight for professional status, along with a populist demand for
recognition 6f Africans' pdlitical rights and cultural worth.
During the 1940s, the two largest professional categories, teachers and
nurses, displayed militancy unprecedented for a middle class obsessed with
respectability. Led by David Bopape, an East Rand Communist, and A.P.
Mda, the future Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) leader, the Transvaal
African Teachers Association' campaigned for salary raises. The climax was
a march of 12,000 teachers;'1 parents, and students through downtown
Johannesburg on May 12, 1944^  winning significant gains. In Umtata, the
largest town in the Transkei, student nurses struck in 1941. Fears of
repetitions led to the inclusion of black nurses in the national nurses
association (albeit on a minority basis).52
After the NP came to power, the black middle classes faced a
government bent on intensifying racial restrictions, while their working
conditions deteriorated. As the only classes of Africans able to compete or
socialize with whites, they were the principal victims of measures intended
to restrict black professionals, repress black political activity, and exclude
blacks from contact with whites outside the workplace. Despite this, the
numbers of the new petite bourgeoisie swelled rapidly in these years.
Between 1946 and 1960, the total number of black professionals rose from
31,400 to 65,700, when it included half the country's teachers and one-third
of its medical personnel.53 Yet teacher pay scales remained frozen, while
their working conditions deteriorated under Bantu Education policy of
larger classes loads. Many also chafed under white authority, reflected in
a syllabus considered racist, an all-white school inspectorate, and pay
discrimination.54 Black nurses !als6 suffered from lower salaries, inferior
training facilities, and the segregation of the Nursing -Association.55
Students faced crowded classrooms;-poor food, and dormitories with no
privacy, as rapid growth overstretched school resources, and tension with
paternalistic whites in charge.156 Traders and independent professionals lost
premises in city centers under1 the Group Areas Act. If apartheid provoked
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anger generally among blacks, it was worst among young professionals.57
, In this context, it is hardly surprising that the corporate struggles of
black professionals converged with political struggles for nationalist ends.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, teacher groups were politicized by
young, militant leaders such as Bopape and Zeph Mothopeng, another
future PAC figure. They campaigned against Bantu Education, and many
were also ANC activists.*8 When the Nursing Act was amended in 1957 to
segregate nursing bodies, African nurses demonstrated.59 African high
school pupils developed a new protest repertoire in their rural boarding
schools, including class boycotts, arson, and attacks on teachers.60 Black
university students protested poor conditions and the imposition of
segregation at Fort Hare, the only black-oriented university, and became a
key source of ANC leaders through the Youth League.61 Indeed, the new
African middle class rose to the fore in nationalist organizations, elbowing
the notables aside. (Among the accused in the main political trials of the
1950s and early 1960s, salaried professionals and white-collar workers
considerably outnumbered independent professionals and traders, the core
of the old elite.)62
The corporate coherence and national-mindedness of many in the
professional strata contrasted with the weakness of organization and action
in the black working classes. At their peak, black trade unions organised
40% of the African industrial workforce iri the mid-1940s, and the greatest
strike til then in South Africa occcurred in 1946, when 70,000 black miners
briefly walked out.63 But black unions declined rapidly after the miners'
strike was crushed and the white-led labor movement accommodated itself
to apartheid. In any event, only % of the entire industrial workforce was
organized even at the unions' peak. In the 1950s, the ANC-aligned South
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) never claimed more than
50,000 members. Even among unionized African workers, neo-traditional
homeboy networks remained the building-blocks of organization.64
Indeed, in the postwar era, the limited extent of class accomodation
and corporatism distinguished South Africa from other African and new
industrial countries.65 In non-settler African colonies, the indigenous petite
bourgeoisie was incorporated into the dominant alliance. In newly-
industrialized countries such as Argentina or Brazil, populist regimes gave
a prominent role to urban middle classes and incorporated the unskilled
working class into parties and unions. In South Africa, the black middle
classes' position worsened after 1948, whileworking-class incorporation was
*t • 1 6
limited to whites and the small minorities of skilled colored and Asian
workers allowed into their unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act.
Liberalizing measures like those elsewhere were considered in South Africa
during and just after the war.66 But while it is debatable whether Smuts's
United Party, itself severely compromised with segregation, would have
implemented such measures, the NP's victory in 1948 put an end to their
discussion. Without the state-aided corporatist structures that marked
populist regimes elsewhere, black workers remained fragmented and
parochial in outlook, leaving patrimonialpolitics more influential in South
Africa than in other semi-industrialized countries.
HI. THE NARROW NATURE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The patron-client networks running though black society were both
causes and consequences of the fragmentary nature of the public sphere in
South Africa. The harrbwness of the public sphere, limiting the vigor of
public opinion and political participation, is an important aspect of the
South African polity in this period. Habermas defines the public sphere as
the space where public discussion and criticism of government can occur."
The literature suggests that the strength of public opinion depends on
literacy (the capacity to communicate beyond personal contacts),
communicative competence (understanding politics) and liberty (free
communications institutions such as the press, church, theatres, pubs, etc.)68
Public opinion is formed in the public sphere. A narrow public sphere
means that public opinion involves few, and that the pressure oh
government and mobilizing capacity that public opinion represents is weak'.
When society is honeycombed with particularisms by illiteracy and
parochial social ties, as South Africa was, the public space is narrow. Before
the 1950s, two-thirds of African children in South Africa received no
schooling at all. In rural areas, where most lived, pagan parents often
opposed schooling because Christian missions offered it. Instead, education
there centered on age groups, initiation, and traditional gender roles.69 In
1951, only around 700,000 out of the country's __-million adult Africans
could read English, drastically limiting their opportunities to learn about or
discuss the broader society.70 As Touraine puts it, "Rural isolation,
illiteracy, urban marginality, and the strength of networks of personal and
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family relations limit participation in public life."71
Reflecting the low level of literacy, newspaper readership in black
communities in South Africa was quite limited before the mid-1960s. As
late as i962, only 7% of African adults read a daily paper.72 More than
eight out of ten read no newspapers at all. Almost all those who. did lived
in cities, 'especially Johannesburg, drawn from the narrow stratum of middle-
class me'h. In the bantustans, small towns, and white farms where most
Africans' lived, newspapers were rare, except in the hands of the occasional
teacher, preacher, lawyer, or clerk. In Natal, for example, only one African
in 25 read The Daily News. Durban's largest paper, in 1962, while the Zulu-
language Ilanga reached just one in 20.73 Even amid the rows of brick
houses and long, low migrant hostels stretching through the townships, only
one adult in five read an English-language daily, Nor was the gap filled by
electronic media: only 12% of African homes had radios in 1962, usually
amid the neat curtains and lounge sets of the urban middle class, while
South Africa had no television until 1976. The same patterns prevailed in
colored communities, where seven in ten did not read a daily paper and
those who did were concentrated in the cities and upper-income groups.
Instead, communication in black areas was marked by the predominance
of the oral and vernacular, reinforcing the importance of direct, personal
relationships and networks. It was a culture of face-to-face discussions -
between family members, neighbors, and notables in township yards, streets,
and shebieens, between clan members, migrants, and chiefs in rural
homesteads, between workmates in factories, busses, and farms,, between
home-boys and indunas in hostels and mine compounds. Describing a
Transkeian village in the early 1960s, Beryl Pauw writes: > ••..-•••'••
"News from the world outside comes through visits to town or form
visitors or migrants returning from more distant centers. Local
persons representing links with the larger society are the headman,
who serves as his people's link with the government, the Methodist
minister, school teachers, most of them not permanently resident at
Mlanjeni, and the white trader."74
Even in the towns, the bulk of black people were dependent on the
"township telegraph" - gossip and rumor ~ for most of their news. "Mass"
communications were also largely oral: political meetings, church services,
chiefly courts and assemblies, story-tellers and praise-singers, or the reading
aloud of newspapers to the illiterate. These parochial information flows
helped underpin the patrimonial character of state and society.
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The urban mainline churches, the outgrowth of European missionary
efforts, were ajso relatively weak in the decades before the 1960s. Cite
census data here: .^ the low percentage of the black population in urban
mainstream churches, and the low proportion of churches in urban areas.
This had a two-fold significance for the constitution of the public sphere.
Urban mainline churches had far greater resources than either rural or
separatist institutions. They were also broader in their orientation: urban
congregations tended to be multi-ethnic or tribal, while the cult itself was
more universalist in outlook.75 The contrast with the rural church was
striking. A research report from a Ciskeian village, Gobozana, told how the
two churches lacked regular ministers, and one lacked a building. Another,
from the Transkei, tells how religion reinforced particularism: church,
village, and kinship boundaries all overlapped.76
The result of these social and institutional characteristics was the
weakness of public opinion, understood as a process of public discussion and
criticism of government. For reasons of language and education, urban
political meetings were incomprehensible to most rural people or illiterate
migrants. As ANC and Communist Party veteran Elia$ Motsoaledi noted,
"They spoke in English -- but English was not the language of the
people."77 Coertze linked limited media exposure in Atteridgeville in the
1950s to low political awareness:
"[O]nly a few individuals with whom we came into contact tried to
keep up with the most important world events or could discuss the
contents of important political speeches. Along with the comments
of our informants, it was also our own independent conclusion that
very few of the residents tried to keep up with or had a good
knowledge of what was described to us as "higher politics": the
successes and failures of leading figures among the Bantu in urban
areas in their efforts to attain integration with whites.... The influence
of the above-mentioned publications still left the readers as spectators
on the sidelines of the political arena."78
Likewise, Gerhart notes, "Most rural born workers, having little or no formal
education, found the workings of a modern economic system far beyond
comprehension." She quotes East Rand activist Bopape: "It is regrettable
to note that the African people as a whole do not understand the laws that
contain the principles of color bar."79
Isolation from the wider world was often partly the result of the quest
for autonomy by small communities, and the intimacy of bonds within them.
Hofmeyr tells how chiefs tried to "oralize" written documents from the
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white administration. "Such oralizing can be seen in things like an insistence
on oral messenger and oral memory, as well as an attempt to subordinate
I,.', . literacy as the medium of ruling to institutions of public assembly, face-to-
"'.'., face assembly, and personal audience."80 Similar effects resulted in urban
areas from the inward-looking focus of churches and other township
, ,i?[. groups.81 Thus, despite problems such as police harassment, low pay, and
-i-w: -s day-to-day discrimination, for most blacks, there were few chances to learn
0,. '/: about or act on the ties between the broader political world and their own
*^'.-. , lives before the mid-1960s. Rather, political thought and action centered
' '..'.' more, on strong personalities and local grievances than ideological themes.
IV. AMBIGUOUS OPPOSITION: BLACK POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION
The character of organized black opposition in postwar South Africa
reflected the relations prevailing within society and state, as well as activists'
ideas and experiences. Despite, the widespread impression of the ANC as
. a mass juggernaut in the 1950s, it was largely an alliance of local-level elites,
.,., ;. . . much like other African and Latin American political movements. Involved
; ...;..',',',.."an patrimonial politics &ftd official structures even as it increasingly
r.... ,_ confronted the regime, its organization was localistic arid uneven, often
:,:•,.,. , paralyzed by role conflict. Colourjedpoiiucs centered on the franchise and
"„',,:": '\pcal patronage, while small groups of intellectuals quarrelled, ignored by
..,.'?' the masses. Indian politics, too, mi^ed patronage with militancy.
, The ANC, the principal African political organization, Was the main
national network of the African elite through the 1950S.' It was established
in 1912, two years after.lhe-white-ruled Union of South Africa was formed
,.,frpm four provinces: two former British colonies, the Cape of Good Hope
• and Natal, and two.former Afrikaner republics, the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State. (Ironically,; the ANC:was created two years before the
National Party, which would become its great antagonist.) In its first
decades, the ANC represented the educated middle class and the chiefs.
The ANC practiced, a ^politics, of dignified petition and protest. Brief
exceptions occurred^vhen.the Transvaal ANC leadership was caught up in
social unrest onvthe Rand in 1920, and from 1926 to 1928 during the
presidency of Josiah Gumede, who was close to the Communist Party.82
It reached its nadir in 1936, when it failed to resist the removal of Africans
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from the voters roll shared with white and coloured in the Cape. The ANC
was patiently revived in the 1940s by Dr. A.B. Xuma, though it remained
essentially urban and elitist.83
The ANC set a new course after the NP won the 1948 white election.
Apartheid put the older notables on the defensive, while the militant ANC
Youth League and Communist Party grew in influence. Led by teachers
and professionals, including Anton Lembede, A.P Mda, Oliver Tambo,
Walter Sisulu, and Nelson Mandela, Youth League backed candidates the
leadership at the 1949 ANC conference. They also pushed through a
Program of Action calling for strikes and civil disobedience against
apartheid and favoring African nationalism. During the 1950s, the ANC led
protests and worked closely with the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the
white Congress of Democrats. Activists of the banned South African
Communist Party (SACP) were prominent in those groups, and to a lesser
extent in the ANC.
Yet while the ANC developed a new protest repertoire and allies during
the 1950s, its values and aims changed remarkably little. Both the younger
white-collar and older notable segments of the elite were products of
mission schooling and relatively privileged backgrounds. Christian values
informed their political thinking and practices. As Glaser notes, "Although
organizations such as the ANC and the Congress Youth League challenged
hegemonic cultural notions of racial domination and supremacy, they
simultaneously embraced most of the values of the dominant Western
culture throughout the 1940s and 1950s: patriarchal family structures;
reverence of education; disapproval of drugs, alcohol, and promiscuity;
adherence to the law; respect for private property (though of course this did
not apply to the Communists who had penetrated these organizations);
revulsion of violence; a sense of living for the future rather than for the
here-and-now; the work ethic."84
Albert Luthuli, ANC President from 1950 to 1967, declared that he
sought power-sharing with whites, not black rule. While he favored peaceful
protest, this was more for the moral impact of suffering for a cause than its
significance in power politics.85 His view - "the road to freedom is through
the cross" — was widely shared. Content analysis of speeches by national
and branch ANC leaders during the 1950s showed that language extolling
"a martyr-like passive-resistance demeanor" was the most frequently used.
A typical example: "We the oppressed people are prepared to sacrifice with
our bodies or blood if freedom should be achieved in that manner."86 An
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emphasis on racial partnership also appeared in the movement's program,
the Freedom Charter, formulated in 1955. It proposed a democracy with
safeguards for minority groups, social democratic policies, land reform, and
public ownership of the country's "mineral wealth, banks, and monopoly
industries." (Africanists criticized the document, feeling it. reflected
Communist influence and rejecting its affirmation that South. Africa
belonged to both black and white).87 So despite the ANC's greater
activism and programmatic clarity, it is hard to dispute Adam's view that it
was more "a pressure group than a revolutionary movement."88
Indeed, the ANC could be viewed as the aggregate of the local
followings of "big men," more like the anti-colonial and populist movements
elsewhere in the 1950s than a Western or Leninist party.89 These leaders
drew strength from addressing concerns of their followings, rather than
broad ideological issues. Thus Lodge writes that "the movement was built
on strong personal loyalties rather than bureaucratic control.... The extent
to which the ANC interested itself in questions of everyday life was in the
ultimate analysis more important in sustaining its support than its attitudes
towards whites, socialism, or the Cold War."90 For example, in Brakpan on
the East Rand, the Advisory Board was controlled by Communists in the
1940s and the ANC in the 1950s because of the standing, charisma, and
following of school teachers who stood for the Board.91
In fact, in many places, ANC and SACP leaders sought key positions
in the local patronage systems, with the access to resources, prestige, and
social networks they offered. Cobley pointed to the "great awakening" of
Advisory Boards in the 1940s, as a new generation of populist leaders seized
the opportunities they presented.92 Youth League calls for a boycott of
Abs were consistently rejected. During the 1940s and 1950s, ANC and
SACP members sat on or on or controlled Advisory Boards in major cities,
including Brakpan, Benoni, and Germiston on the East Rand, Soweto,
Atteridgevillej Nelspruit, Port Elizabeth, and East London. "This appeared
to be a symptom of their popularity rather than their isolation," as Lodge
puts it.93 The figures involved were substantial men in their communities.
Soweto AB members included ANC National Executive member and trade
unionist Leslie Massina and the respected P.Q. Vundla, Brakpan's
prominent activist David Bopape, and New Brighton's leading Communist
and unionist Raymond Mhlaba. (Similarly, one of the ANC's rare rural
bridgeheads, the North Sotho-speaking Sekhukuniland reserve in the
Northern Transvaal, came through control of migrant workers' burial
societies, the linchpins connecting homeboy networks in Johannesburg
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hostels to clans in the villages.94) Some activists combined help to
individuals case-by-case with mass protest, like populists elsewhere.
The institutional and ANC elites not only overlapped; they also shared
the political culture of the dientelist state. Noting "the ambiguous character
of African opposition during the 1950s," Atkinson's study of East London
points out that "both groups were products of patriarchalism, and hence
their style of politics were often similar." She adds, "Significantly* there
were important points of agreement between 'radical' political organizations
(such as the ANC) and Advisory Boards. The implication of this is that the
cleavage between the Boards and popular organizations was not
unbridgeable (in contrast to the situation of the Black Local Authorities
during the 1980s)."95 Delius paints a similar picture of rural politics in this
era. He cites the case of Moretsele, a chiefs son from Sekhukuniland,
Transvaal ANC treasurer, and the owner of a Johannesburg cafe where
political meetings took place, cumulating traditional authority, political:
prestige, and modern resources. He also notes that as Sebatakgomo, the
rural protest movement in Sekhukuniland, grew in the 1950s by linking into •.
village relationships, it became increasingly North Sotho-oriented in
"political focus and flavor," representing less the communization of the
countryside than the patrimionalization of the Party.96
Organizationally, the ANC, too, had a weak center and strongpeHphery,
like the South African state. With over 300 branches thinly spread over a
country the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi, communicating mostly
by mail, contact with local leaders was irregular and infrequent. The most
detailed analysis of ANC structure in the 1950s, by Feit, concluded:
"Everything encouraged branch autonomy. Control by the higher
bodies was largely lacking, and the paths followed by individual
branches seem to have been left in the hands of individual branch
committees. This meant, in effect, that where branches had a
determined and able leadership they were active, whereas branches
without such advantages were stagnant, sporadic, or else vanished
entirely. ... The extent to which national policy was implemented
depended, therefore, upon how well branch leaders understood that
policy, and to the extent that it suited what they felt were their local
needs."97
Delius recently reached virtually identical conclusions. "Many of the rural
branches appear to have rested heavily on the initiatives and interests of
individual founding members."98 The dominance of local leaders reinforced
patrimonial politics, as Atkinson notes. "The role of the Advisory Board
23
was strengthened by the distinctly localistic color of African populism during
the 1950s.... On the one hand, the emphasis on local grievances and goals
suited the political style of the Advisory Board and strengthened its links
with the ANC; on the other hand, this localism unintentionally sustained the
ethos of partriarchalism in the cities."99
Impatience with the politics of accommodation led to the break-away
of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) from the ANC in April 1959.100 Its
leader was Robert Sobukwe, a 3'5-yea'r-Qld African languages lecturer at
Johannesburg's University of the Witwatersrand. The PAC attracted those
the ANC had neglected: youth, migrant workers, and poorly organized
areas. At least in town: at every level, PAC members were ten years
younger than their ANC counterparts. It was popular among younger
African teachers, and through them connected to school pupil networks,
particularly in the PWV and Cape Town regions.101 It won a much larger,
informal following among tsotsis, the gangs of school dropouts, who were
drawn to politics for the first time. Africanism's appeal to migrant laborers
derived from rhetoric and social networks familiar to them, while the ANC
was largely rooted in the ties and outlooks of permanently urbanized
Africans. In other words, the PAC appealed to males on the lower rungs
of the traditional and capitalist orders. Openings for the PAC were greatest
in the Western Cape and the Vaal Triangle, with weak ANC structures,
masses of jobless youth on the streets and a substantial migrant workforce.
Migrant workers also spread PAC influence back from Cape Town to their
Transke homesteads.
The movement's leaders preached an exclusive African nationalism.
Like Sobukwe, they were drawn from the Africanist faction in the ANC,
hostile to the whites, Indians, and Communists in the Congress Alliance.
The PAC's message was blunt: "If a white man will not obey an African, he
must pack and go. African is for Africans alone."102 Its popularity
reflected frustration with the ANC's! moderation and non-violence.
Sobukwe and his colleagues had long thought the masses so angry that only
heroic leadership was needed for repressed rage to explode into mass
uprising, and they promised "freedom by 1963." For hot-blooded young
men, unable to attain the work or status of adults, anti-white discourse and
calls for action had a powerful attraction. "What the PAC was actually
saying, or not saying," writes Gerhart, "was less important than the
'language' it was speaking, a language attuned to the mood of youth, in
contrast to the more restrained accents of the ANC, 'an organization,' as
one PAC man put it, 'of our fathers and; mothers.'"103 The same held for
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migrants, trapped by poverty and passes, and intellectuals attracted for more
sophisticated reasons to the movement's romantic evocation of the African
past. ' • • • - • .
While African politics was marked by exclusion from the central
political system, the politics of the coloured (mixed-race) minority ( % of
the population in 1950) had revolved around it. In the Cape, where -
s of the colored population lived; colored-men could vote for
parliament under a qualified franchise and serve on provincial and
municipal councils. Until the 1950s, in fact, the strongest force in colored
politics was not the extra-parliamentary movements, but Smuts's old United
Party, which consistently won solid coloured support at the polls. Soon after
taking power, the NP announced plans to remove the coloreds from the
common voters roll, and did so in 1956. The years from 1948 to 1951 saw
a wave of protest in the colored community of Cape Town against the
tightening of segregation and the threat to the franchise, but resistance
fizzled out in quarrels between the narrow circles of coloured activists in the
Communist Party, the African People's Organization (a-decades-old and
largely spent force), and the Unity Movement.104 ; •:.
The Unity Movement was the most important extra-parliamentary
group in the coloured community.105 Its principal, bases included a section
of the teachers - highly influential in the coloured community - organized
in the Teachers League of SA, along with colored sport administrators
(often the same people, due to the role of schools as sport centers).
Organized around Marxist educational and cultural activities, it preached
boycotting all government-created representative bodies and segregated
institutions. Yet while the UM was the most important force among the
colored intelligentsia, and enjoyed some support among Cape African
teachers, it was largely isolated from the masses by its elitism and rigid
boycott position. At the local level, colored politics centered on non-
partisan Ratepayers Associations, which acted as support-building patronage
organizations for politicians standing for city councils, connecting with other
local groups and clan networks within their neighborhoods.106
The politics of the Indian minority, % of the population in 1960,
differed somewhat from that of the coloureds in direction and militancy.
Concentrated in Natal province, it included a Hindu majority mostly
descended from indentured cane-cutters who had immigrated in the 19th
century, and a Moslem minority who came as traders, along with a small but
fast-growing professional stratum drawn from both groups. Political
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organization among Indians began in 1896, when the future Mahatma
Gandhi founded the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) to struggle against
discriminatory measures imposed by Natal's white minority government.
After Gandhi's return to India in 1923(7), communal.life was dominated by
the conservative, ethnically-oriented trader segment of the elite, which
formed the Natal Indian Organization. However, in 1945, a revitalized and
radicalized NIC, led by Communists and Gandhians, waged a passive
resistance campaign against anti-Indian legislation, which helped inspire the
ANC's Defiance Campaign. When government offered Indians two Mps on
a separate voters' roll in the 1948 elections, the. NIC also organized a
successful boycott of the polls. The 1947 "Doctors Pact" between ANC and
NIC leaders signalled a convergence between the two groups, formalized in
the Congress Alliance of the 1950s. However, while the NIG dominated
organized politics, many Indians remained poised between its commitment
to non-racialism and the ethnocentrism of the trader/religious elite. Racial
tensions were deepened by the legacy of the days when Africans rioted in
some Indian sections of Durban in 1949.
The major organized opposition movements, thus, were marked by the
same clientelism, elitism, and localism that characterised the state and
political society generally. These factors were connected to the ambivalence
in the leadership of such movements, opposing government policy yet
without aspiring to topple the regime, much less their own position as
community pillars. The involvement of ANC (and other) figures in
patrimonial relations was the great unmentionable, a hidden transcript
jarring with their resolutely modern public discourse, yet it was also the
secret that largely animated the movement. In other words, ambiguity in
black politics was a consequence both of structures and of values existing
within the black communities. The exceptions - notably the PAC ~ sought
to rally those excluded by the accommodations and the overlapping systems
of authority that ordered black communities, but still operated within the
same polarities and universe of discourse. ... .. ,.
V. POLITICAL CULTURE
Together, the public-private relation, the nature of the public sphere,
., and the values and practices of opposition all help mould the political
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culture of dominated groups. They influence the content of the hidden
transcripts that circulate among them, the submerged networks through
which these flow to define sub-cultures, and the shape of the free spaces
that allow public interaction.107 The resulting identities and
understandings of community frame the possibilities of collective action. In
South Africa, linkages between the public and private spheres were
mediated by notable-run clentelism and professional corporatism; a narrow
public sphere, largely limited to the middle classes, was associated with weak
public opinion; and the values and practices of the opposition were
liberalism, patronage, and populism. The black middle class constructed a
political identity that reflected its ambivalent self-understanding. This
involved assimilationism and shame about its own adhesion to traditional
values. The black popular classes built their own political culture based on
patrimonialism and localism, a mix of vibrant local identities, ethnic and
racial stereotypes, and a sense of inferiority before whites. The social order
enjoyed considerable legitimacy thanks to the synthesis of patrimonial and
market discourses. Conceptions of citizenship also remained distinct, the
middle classes' remaining narrow and oriented towards power-sharing with
whites, the popular classes' parochially focused on local communities.
The best-known trait of the political culture of South Africa's black
middle classes until the mid-1960s was their desire for assimilation into
white society. They blamed the vanquished status of Africans on popular
folkways, seeking freedom and power in European culture and
techniques.108 The values of middle-class Africans were deeply marked by
faith in gradual change through co-operation with white liberals, reflecting
the teachings of English-speaking mission churches and church school
education. The hegemony of Western values and the legitimacy of the
social order in this groups was strikingly demonstrated by a study conducted
between 1939 and 1956, which involved over 1,000 educated Africans.
Asked how they would react to various conflicts, they overwhelmingly
favored Western ethical, legal, and Christian norms, repudiating tribal
attitudes, compliance through fear, or non-compliance. Biesheuwel, the
investigator, wrote, "On the whole, one finds remarkably little conflict in the
minds of educated Africans concerning Western values, and except in the
cases [of racial discrimination], no unwillingness to accept these values as
the basis for individual conduct, nor to accept the machinery of law as
indispensable to social order and good government." Indian intellectuals
also identified with Europeans (though they, too, resented segregation).109
Indeed, the powerful attraction which the dominant white group held for the
black middle class was underlined by their view of whites as a reference
'
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group. White fashions and houses were in vogueamong them; so were hair
straighteners and skin-lighteners. In middle-class;, homes, it was ,a severe
reproach to say, "Whites don't do that." Among; the-elite of.one Reef
township in this era, only two lecture topics drew full houses: politics - and
white manners.110
Middle class striving for whiteness was linked to a sense of class
distinction; Mayer reported that "the better-off element in Soweto ... did
not identify with the working masses (except for a few politically motivated
intellectuals)." A 35-year-old teacher told him, "There is a class distinction
between the rich and the poor. It is automatic."111 The friends of African
teachers and nurses were generally other professionals. Members of the
petite bourgeoisie were horrified at being treated like "ordinary folk" when
police raided rent defaulters. African nurses were reported to be more
hostile to working-class Africans than to whites, while African social workers
preferred socializing with white supervisors to African workers. "We feel
out of place with the ordinary laborer," one said.112
The middle classes' rigid class attitudes were probably related to the
limited social mobility prevalent before the 1960s. Some 55 of 60 members
of Brandel-Syrier's "Reeftown Elite" had professional, salesman, clerk, or
businessman fathers. Likewise, Kuper reported that members of the African
petite-bourgeoisie in Durban were ten to thirty times likelier to have had
professional fathers than the African population at large.113 Most of the
few. blacks who got to secondary school or university up to the 1960s also
eaffie:from middle class families.114 The closed character of the middle
classes was shown in marriage, too: their spouses were also middle class.1"
The outlook of middle-class youth reflected in part the middle-class
subculture of which they were a part. Church and rural mission schools
kept them under white control and off the streets. Like their parents, if
they became politically involved, it was in the ANC, though its Youth
League.116 et However.they were also subject to many cultural currents
touching other township youth ~ in dress, the mass media, etc ~ and they,
too, shared the tsotsis' anger and impatience with the status quo. In
consequence, middle-class youth balanced between two sub-cultures: the
respectable world of their parents, and the tsotsi world of their age-mates.
Yet despite class exclusivism, the middle classes were bound to others
by kin, ethnic, and patrimonial ties. The middle classes made exceptions to
their snobbery for lower-class kin and homeboys. Relationships with them
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were reinforced by the contact ensured between the middle and working
classes; by legal racial segregation.117 Even the educated, Westernized,
white-collar group also practiced traditional male initiation and lobola
(bridewealth), and they were as likely as the uneducated to believe in the
power of the ancestors."8
Such attitudes were more than vestiges of the past: they reflected
patrimonial relations involving major investments of resources and influence
in participants' lives. Adolescent initiation involved a weeks of traditional
education (and frequently, painful circumcision). Lobola made grooms pay
months or years of savings to their brides' families, allying the two lineages
and creating obligations of redistribution to poorer relations. Belief in
ancestral spirits formed the apex of the lineage system: ancestors who had
lived on land established their descendants' claim to it, while elders' power
derived from their position as the closest surviving family members to the
ancestors.119 Alongside Christian practice, the middle classes also made
ritual sacrifices of expensive animals and followed other customs intended
to propitiate ancestors and mark rites of passage. Such relations reflected
the traditional networks of obligation in which they participated, and
provided models for neo-traditional forms of clientelism. Thus, for example,
Sherwood's survey of African government clerks found that they endorsed
middle class values of hard work and sobriety, yet departed from the
Weberian ideal of impartial civil servants in their favoritism towards kin and
lack of impersonality.120
Tension between class and community values generated "culture
shame" in many middle-class blacks. Mayer wrote:
"There were often traces of 'negative identity5 when educated Soweto
people spoke about Western civilization. ... Anxiously uncertain
whether blacks would ever be able to catch up with whites, people
would speak of 'narrowing the gap.... The educated often referred to
their 'inferiority complexes'...."
One Sowetan said, "The Europeans have brought [civilization] to us, and
therefore, for historical reasons, they are more advanced than us. They are
still superior to us in all fields." Another said, "For us to become truly
civilized requires the closest imitation of the Western style in manners,
morals and values, the abandonment of all superstitions and witchcraft, and
of our traditional attire which was nearly nudism."121 "Likewise, Brett
found that among educated young Africans, only a small minority of
intellectuals viewed tribal custom favorably, largely for nationalist
reasons.122 Generally, the African middle class viewed African art and
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culture with disinterest. (Revealingly, writer Nat Nakasa proclaimed he had
more to say to- a white Afrikaner than a visiting Nigerian.)123
In terms of collective identity, the political culture of the black
popular classes was extremely diverse. Within a huge diversity of localized
networks, discourses circulated, some patrimonial, some Western-oriented.
Often more than one could be found together, reflecting the syncretic
consciousness of individuals and groups. Coertze's comment on
Atteridgeville applies more widely:
"What we have to do with here is not a highly-integrated social unit
that serves as a basis for the construction of political power structures.
There is just an arbitrarily thrown-togethef group of residents who
show little homogeneity in ways of life and language. There is only
a weakly-developed consciousness of themselves as a specific
group."124 ; •
This culture was the produce of influences from above and below. A
cacophony of patrimonial discourses was' voiced within black communities.
In rural areas, kinship ties still dominated social relations.125 The
dominant discourse was a patriarchal one of respect for age, gender
': hierarchy, and reciprocity. This was extended to town by migratits'-homeboy
networks, which maintained rurally-oriented identities, particularly among
workers isolated in township hostels or the compounds set up fof migrants
around the mines. Undercurrents of tension between hostel-dwellers and
the more sophisticated city residents occasionally flared into assaults, gang
warfare, or disorders, like the clashes that broke out between-residents of
Dube Hostel and surrounding areas of Soweto in 1957- While permanent
urban residents werb more open to new associations, they/too, aided clan
members who had come to town, extending lineage ties to them through
"pseudo-kin" discourse (calling them "sister," "father," etc.) that re-valued
clan association.126 Even among permanent town dwellers, the language
used revealed how older relationships were inlaid into new ones. Forms of
address normally used for elders were'also applied to young professionals,
while at 1950s weddings, bards would sing the praises of the educated as if
they were chiefs.127 These neo-traditional discourses were expressions of
the neo-traditional practices of clieritelism prevailing.
Another set of particularist relationships existed in the separatist
African churches, growing rapidly during the postwar era. Centered on
faith-healing and witchcraft, for many city dwellers they filled •£' social
vacuum left by the decline of the chiefs' authority. Church leaders took
their place, re-arranging families jnto tightly-knit units that encapsulated the
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private lives of their followers. These churches deliberately kept their
followers out of the public sphere, accepting apartheid.128 Even adherents
of ^missionary or mainline churches among the masses lived a syncretic
religious existence. Most continued to accept the ancestor cult in their
private lives, with the values and power relations implied, while universalistic
Christian discourse governed public relations with other church
members.129
Another, powerful form of identity centered on of ethnic, linguistic,
or racial distinction. These discourses were presented as outgrowth of
patrimonial relations: the discourse of "kith and kin" stretched from the
lineage to ethnic, linguistic, or racial groups through a common ancestry and
past, realL6r mythical. In this way, ideas and practices emphasizing lineage
or clan solidarities, such as lobola. initiation, or the ancestor cult, also
expressed ethnic solidarities. Much the same was true of the
neighborhoods, friendship networks, and voluntary associations working-class
Africans formed, often on geographic, linguistic, and tribal lines. (So
important were these networks that in Atteridgeville, even among the
second generation in town, showed that most knew little about neighbors
belonging to other tribal groups}130 Such bonds were reinforced by
activities organized by tribal authorities. The annual celebrations of the
Xhosa-speaking Mfengu and Rharhabe groups in and around-East London
offer an example. Pauw argues that these factors kept alive a consciousness,
albeit latent, of past tensions between the sub-divisions in each ethnic group,
while towards other Africans, they maintained an awareness of difference
and a degree of disdain.131 (Something similar occurred among South
African Indians, where horizontal castes fused into a vertical hierarchy of
ethno-linguistic and status groups.132) So pervasive and mutually
reinforcing were the various patrimonial values and practices - the
traditional and neo-traditional aspects of family life, religious activity, and
ethnic identity - that Mayer dubbed them "the ; old Black
Consciousness."133
Tension between members of different racial and ethnic groups made
stereotyping a prominent cultural feature. These stereotypes were
premised on a normative discourse regarding white, Western, capitalist
culture as superior. For blacks, the result was cultural Shame and self
contempt. Although the "old Black Consciousness" was widespread, so was
ambivalence about it. Sowetans professed scorn for African customs and
"old fashioned" beliefs. Yet the more they insisted on the modernity of
their material culture - brick houses, European dress, and the like - the
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more they betrayed anxiety about it. "In 1965 we found Soweto blacks still
caught in a painful dilemna, complaining that whites regarded them as
culturally inferior and yet admitting that they were," Mayer wrote.134 A
tendency to "play the fool" before whites reflected such internalized
prejudices. Gerhart noted: "For many Africans, the only way to cope with
the brutality of race relations and with the cultural disorientation of the
urban adjustment was to internalize the role and personality which white
sterotyped perceptions imposed, that of the stupid but good-natured child,
dependent on superior white 'parents' for constant guidance."135
Similar attitudes were noted among coloreds in Cape Town by Stone:
"Lower-class coloreds have tended to view themselves as the dependent,
outcast stepchildren, of the whites, and to bewail their rejection by whites.
... Negroid elements are denigrated and white aspects idealized."136
Finally, both Indians and coloureds looked on Africans with fear and
disdain137. Africans, for their part, resented these middlemen - strongly,
in the case of Indians, perceived as aliens, less so in the case of coloureds,
towards whom a degree of kinship was felt.
Self-contempt among blacks went together with admiration for whites,
particularly English-speakers. A distinction was made between Afrikaners,
seen as ignorant bigots responsible for apartheid by electing the NP
government, and English-speakers, who were seen as employers, liberal,
tolerant, and fair. (This was also how the English-speakers saw things.)
Mayer comments:
"This distinction seems to have played a critical part in preventing
total black-white polarization and confrontation. For the postulated
contrast between the 'good' English and Jews and 'cruel' Afrikaners
seems to have served, in the case of many working people, as a barrier
against a fusion of the [market-based] class and [racism-based] pariah
models [of South African society.] In 1965, while acutely aware both
of their low wages presumably paid by Englishmen and of their pariah
status in the wider system (dominated by Afrikaners) somehow they
didn't seem to put two and two together. They did not blame the low
wages on the wider system and the way it loads things in their
employers'favor."138
Rather than blaming apartheid for their poverty, blacks blamed themselves
(for ignorance, laziness, etc.) Thus, while black workers held racial and
ethnic stereotypes, politically one could "speak of a lack of political
awareness or even lack of political sense. At this level, they seemed willing
to see themselves in the role of a normal working class in a capitalist
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system, and to ignore theif'abnormal position as unfree labor."139
Thus, despite anger at racial discrimination, the broader social order
was legitimated syneretically, through discourses describing the articulation
of traditional and modern social relations. Glaser notes:
"[I]t is dangerous';' particularly before the 1960s, to underestimate the
extent to-Which-the hierarchical order was maintained through the
cultural* demerits of hegemony. ... [Cjommon ideological threads in
mainstream Witwatersf and [African] culture throughout the 1940s and
1950s can be listed as'follows; adherence to the law (albeit often
reluctantly and with striking exceptions in the cases of pass and beer
brewing laws); respect'for• private property; rejection of violence;
acceptance oLthe work-ethic;ifespect for schooling and education;
patriarchal-family arrangerheftt$;jrispect for elders; prudent living for
the future; adherence to'religion' whether in the form of Christianity,
ancestor worship, or hybrid faiths."140 .
Likewise, in riiral-afeaSy'the persistence1 of chieftaincy and lineage-type
forms reflected a response to the state bureaucracy and industrialization by
adapting older discourses and relations.
While these discourses helped legitimize the status quo, they were not
mere mystifications. White domination and black poverty were keenly
decried - but in private narratives of misfortune circulating locally, without
causal connections. Popular responses to these problems were usually
individualistic rather than collective, framed in the language and practice of
patrimonial relations. This reflected the outlooks of subordinate groups and
the consciousness-lowering impact of the patronage linakges they
maintained with more powerful elements. Gluckmari's work on Zululand
revealed how subordinates (women, young men, and commoners) skilfully
played off chiefs against white administrators.141 Such phenomena led
Beinart to conclude that "the metaphor of articulation has some value if it
is turned on its head — that is, if the balance of power between articulating
forces is reconsidered and greater allowance is made for changes in the
African communities, and for analysis of politics and consciousness." In this
view, the preservation and extension of lineage-type relations through
migrant labor was as much the choice of Africans as of mineowners.142
Likewise, Mayer described how members belonged to separatist churches,
because,^  while insulating them1 from the larger community, they formed a
refuge from its anomie.143; In short, traditionalist relations, while involving
subordination, also involved negotiation over identity, resources, and valued
social ties.
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One group - urban black working-class youth -- did not share in the
value consensus of this era. Educated, jobless township youth suffered both
traditional (age-based) and modern (market-related) subordination. While
their parents worked, urban African adolescents (particularly young men)
developed their own world and codes in the tsotsi subculture. Tsotsis were
youth gangs growing out of neighborhood friendship networks, which
included most urban school dropouts.144 (Similar groiups among coloreds
were known as skollies.) They inverted the dominant cultural values,
rejecting elders' authority, the work ethic,, manners, delayed gratification,
and sexual restraint. The gangs detested middle-class, "scuze-me" africans:
what they wanted, they took. Tsotsis had their own styles - in the 1950s,
narrow-brimmed hats and wide-legged trousers - and their own language,
tsotsitaal. based on Afrikaans. Tensions between tsotsis and their elders
sometimes became violent, as in East London's East Bank township in 1958,
when grown men first attacked gangsters, then any young males.145
Despite the existence of marked generational tension, however, urban
.youth remained atomized rebels without a cause. As noted above, they
were little involved in politics before the rise of the PAC. (During the
1950s, their political role was limited to occasionally adding muscle to the
enforcement of boycotts and protests.) Their political views were
unsophisticated and based on experience of poverty, discrimination, and
white power. "For the most part," Glaser writes, "tsotsi cultural resistance
was unarticulated, incoherent, inconsistent. It was gut level and angry."146
(In the rural areas, tsotsi sub-culture had only limited impact. Schooling
remained scarce in the country, while traditional education, stick fighting
and age groups, prepared young people for lives revolving around
chieftaincy and migrancy. However, groups of primary-schooled youths
called indlavini mimicked the tsotsi subculture in some respects.)147
Turning to the conceptions of citizenship and community within black
political culture, those of the middle classes were elitist and qualified. The
assimilationist perspective of middle class blacks implied political objectives
limited to power-sharing with whites, expressed by the ANC. As Gerhart
puts it:
"[I]t is important to note that the great majority of educated Africans,
through the 1940s and beyond, continued to adhere to a basically
liberal conception of social and political goals as well as to an
evolutionary view of change. What most Westernized Africans wanted
. ... was the fulfillment of the paternalistic promises of trusteeship:
unfettered opportunity to assimilate European culture and learn
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modern skills, opportunity to demonstrate African competence and to
be accepted, however gradually, as equals in a common, competitive
, society. The right of whites to lead the way was generally assumed:
the African sought simply the right to be included as a 'junior partner*
in the white man's ruling councils, until such time as he was ready to
play his full part as an equal."148
In surveys, many middle-class Africans supported basing voting rights on
education, disfranchising most blacks.149
Similar attitudes were widespread in colored and Indian communities.
Among coloureds, {he principal issue in the 1950s was retaining the
qualified, non-racial franchise, underlining the centrality of the discourse of
assimilation. The Indian elite, for its part, split into two wings. One was
collaborationist, inward-looking and compromise oriented, led by high-caste
property-owners and represented politically in the Natal Indian
Organization. The other elite group, ascendant from the mid-1940s, was
composed of outward-looking professionals and trade unionists, organized
in the Natal Indian Congress, a body allied to the ANC and influenced by
the Communist Party.150 Although the years after 1948, which marked the
rupture of the accommodations that had largely marked relations between
the black and white elites, saw the black elite increasingly come to endorse
militant means of protest, they did not shift towards radical ends.
Mass conceptions of community were marked by the localism of
collective vision and action. The narrow horizons of rural politics struck
many observers. Lodge says that though rural conflict was widespread
between 1940 and 1965, "it was largely a parochial affair." Kotze,. applying
Almond and Verba's categories Transkei's political culture, characterized it
as "largely parochial with very limited participant orientations."151 Concern
about the bureaucratic role of chiefs and migrant labor did not transform
a world-view shaped by the lineage order, patrimonial discourse, and local
concerns into nationalism, as Beinart notes:
"It cannot be assumed that rural people in the earlier decades of this
century saw [political unity] as their paramount aim. The evidence
suggests that their political responses were often particularist and
often separatist. Though aware of the system which gave rise to their
grievances, they tried to establish local autonomy rather than to
challenge and capture the state. They were not necessarily available
for nationalist struggles, or class alliances which sought equal rights
within the country as- a whole."152
Describing the growth of Sebatakgomo in the Northern Transvaal, Delius
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notes a "significant section of the membership believed that national issues
were of doubtful importance and that 'we are only talking about
Sekhukuniland, that is our own place.'""3
Urban political culture, too, tended to be parochial and personalist,
centered on patronage, individual fallowings, and local demands. In
Atteridgeville, Coertze wrote, "support for a particular party had more to do
with the following of persons than support for particular party principles.
Whenever a leading figure from one faction goes over to the other, a group
of personal followers goes together with him."1* Awareness of elite
politics, such as debates within the ANC, was limited to the small literate
stratum, reflecting the narrowness of the public sphere. Coertze notes:
"We were told that the objectives of the ANC are consciously kept out
of township politics because the average resident has no
.. . understanding of the 'bigger issues' and 'higher politics' in which the
:,...; movement,is involved. The purposes of the ANC, our informants
stated, can only be understood by educated people such as teachers,
municipal clerks and others who are concerned with more than local
affairs and regularly read their newspaper.... Between the aspirations
of the ieaders and the disposition of the residents, there is a decided
g a p ' % ,
Although frustration at poverty and discrimination exploded into riot at
times, and. political awareness varied within the popular classes, on the
whole conceptions of community among black South Africans were limited
and narrow before the 1960s.
The nationalist sentiment existing in urban black communities in the
1950s was weak, overlaid on more local loyalties. Pauw noted that in East
London, "The attitude of the majority of townspeople towards the contrast
between tribalism and an inclusive Bantu nationalism is one of compromise:
the ideal of the different tribal groupings moving closer together finds
considerable support, but a significant degree of tribal consciousness and
pride is retained."156 Likewise, Coertze noted a broader vision of a South
African fatherland in Atteridgeville, but he ethno-linguistic identities
remained powerful.157 Beinart describes how a 1950s ANC activist
synthesized nationalist and parochial outlooks, much as others syricretically
combined modern and traditional religion. His "shift to broader nationalist
and class-conscious positions in the 1950s ... was by no means a total
turnabout. He took with him some of the ideas, values, and networks that
had been central to his previous experience; these were overlaid with, or
meshed with, his newly developing political ideas."158 Moreover, the
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"nationalism" referred to above was African nationalism. It was neither an
inclusive black nationalism (bringing together coloureds, Indians, and
Africans) or an inclusive South Africanism for all races. (If coloureds and
Indians had "nationalist" aspirations, these were for integration into the
white South African nation.) ..' • '
'The political culture of black South Africa before the mid-1960s was
thus highly compartmentalized by class, locality, personal loyalties, language,
and race. Middle-class culture was marked by assimilationism and elitism,
that of the popular classes by personalism and localism, while cultural
shame and ethnocentrism were shared* by all A weak sense of African
" national consciousness was overlaid on particularistic loyalties, while radical
ideologies of social change found few supporters;. These characteristics of
the political culture, and the structures^ practices, and values that helped
produce them, had a profound influence on the nature of mass mobilization
and the capacity for social transformation existing in black communities.
VI. PROTEST, MOBILIZATION, AND REPRESSION
The postwar era saw black popular mobilizations of an unprecedented
scale and vigor, but protest was neither widespread nor radical enough to
represent a real menace to the. South African regime. Centered on elite
personalities, many themselves compromised with? the system or willing to,
-they activated the leaders' fallowings and connections. Militant local
subsistence struggles, while intense, were limited in scope and duration.
National protest campaigns knitted together the supporters of local elites,
mobilizing through, their networks and loyalties more than through issues.
The result was a response that was unequal, spasmodic, and largely urban.
It could hardly have been otherwise, given the organizational, leadership,
.and strategic weaknesses of the ANC and other black groups. The type of
. collective response engendered by populist protest, like that in AB elections,
is what Touraine termed "participation without representation":
. mobilization centered on personalities and identities, unmediated by parties
and ideologies. The 1960 Sharpeville crisis, the greatest 1950s-style protest,
also demonstrated its limitations - while foreshadowing certain phenomena
that allowed 1970s protest to transcend them.
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The story of black South African politics in the 1950s is conventionally?
told as a series of mobilizations and protests organized by the ANC as part
of the national struggle against the apartheid regime. It begins withthe
1950 May Day strikes against the banning of the Communist Party and the
1952 Defiance Campaign of civil disobedience against apartheid legislation,
which marked the ANC's shift from an elite to a mass party. These were
followed by a series of single-issue campaigns. Those in urban areas
including opposition to removals and Bantu Education, as well as general
strikes in 1957 and 1958. Rural resistance included women's opposition to
the extension of the internal passport laws to them and conflicts around
cattle culling and grazing land fencing under "betterment" schemes.
Resistance to apartheid reached a crescendo in the Sharpeville crisis, before
pitiless repression crushed it.
;
 Yet the protests of the 1950s must be kept in perspective. They were.
poorly coordinated and symbolic actions, rather than a strategically-
developed threat to the regime. The Defiance Campaign resulted in just
7,000 arrests, of which more than two-thirds took place in the towns of the
Eastern Cape, the ANC's heartland.159 The movements against the
imposition of passes on women, the establishment of Bantu Education, and
forced removals of blacks were localized, limited to a few areas.160 While
the general strikes received substantial if varying responses in Port
Elizabeth, Durban, and Johannesburg, they involved only about - %
of the African non-farm workforce, and just - % of the total non-farm
workforce.161 ANC membership peaked at 100,000 after the Defiance
Campaign, but it plunged by two-thirds within a year, nearing its peak only
at end.162 So no more than % of adult Africans ever belonged to the
ANC in this era (though its influence stretched well beyond its
membership). In short, as Meer writes, the image of massive resistance
"ready for the final plunge" can only be "observed by abstracting the motifs
of rebellion scattered through a tapestry, which otherwise speaks of
reasonable peace and quiet."163
When it did occur, the force of collective action emerged from civil
society, through the mobilization of concerns and networks in specific areas
or groups, more than from organizational initiatives or nationalist ideals.
In the leading study of black politics in the 1950s, Lodge notes:
"Much of the direct action and popular unrest of the decade took
•••'-•• place outside the scope of formal organizations, and the energy of
local and national politicians was often absorbed by the effort to bring
localized subsistence related popular movements within the ANC's
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orbit. In certain centers the ANC's local presence as a community
organization responding to local sources of discontent was of greater
significance to local people than its national program of activity. ...
In these circumstances the particular ideological orientation of the
ANC leadership may have mattered less to ordinary people than the
organization's performance in bread-and-butter struggles."164
Indeed, the collective actions which truly involved mass participation were
usually not called by national political organizations, but emerged out of
subsistence concerns and local initiatives and leadership.- The most
prominent among those were the squatter movements of the 1940s and the
bus boycotts of the 1950s.165 Any one of those movements involved more
people than the Defiance Campaign did country-wide.
The patterns of mobilisation in 1950s ANC campaigns also reflected
the involvement of local elites and the followings to which their networks
were connected.166 Lodge reports, "The consequences of [organizational]
difficulties were ... that effective campaigning often had to depend on local
initiatives and therefore on the personal qualities of local leaders to a much
greater extent than would have been the case had an efficient administrative
machine existed. This was not always to Congress's detriment... [b]ut it did
mean that campaigns were localized and uneven in impact."167 For
instance, in Brakpan, effective beerhall and bus boycotts depended on the
ANC-run AB, whose members enjoyed wide followings.168 Similarly, the
greatest strike of the era, the 70,000-strong African miners strike of 1946,
was based on migrant worker homeboy networks more than formal union
organization.169 In the rural areas, political mobilization focused largely
on chiefs and chieftaincy.170 The reason why ANC campaigns consistently
received their strongest response in Port Elizabeth may well lie in a
particularly dense set of networks and elites. These included the ANC, the
SACP, trade unions, the AB, and a popular rugby board.171
Yet the dawn of the 1960s brought a sense that the pace of political
change was quickening. Independence had begun to sweep across Africa
after Ghana gained its independence in 1957. Political turbulence had
broken out in nearby Rhodesia and Malawi. Rural Natal had been agitated
by protests in 1959. Riots flared in Paarl in the Western Cape in December
and in Cato Manor, Durban in January 1960. In February, British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan warned the white parliament in Cape Town that
the "winds of change" were blowing through the continent. Responding to
the mood, and conscious of PAC competition, the ANC planned an anti-
pass campaign for March 31. To one-up his rivals, the PAC's Sobukwe
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called ori his followers to present themselves, for arrest without passes ten
days earlier.
The PAC protest on Monday, March 21, I960, received a large response
in only two areas: the Vaal Triangle and Cape Town. In Sharpeville, a
crowd of 30,000 gathered outside the police station. Panicked policemen
opened fire, killing 69 people and wounding 183. At a meeting that evening
in Langa township, Cape Town, police opened up on 10,000 people outside
a hostel, killing two, injuring 17, and triggering a riot. As the news of the
Sharpeville and Langa tragedies spread, the whole country was shaken. A
moral and political Rubicon had been crossed. Prime Minister Hendrick
Verwoerd assured Parliament, "We shall remain in power in this white
South Africa," but his grip looked increasingly shaky. In Cape Town,
Africans went on general strike. On March 25, 2,000 marched to police
headquarters there. They dispersed only when police suspended the hated
pass laws, a major victory, soon extended country-wide.
A week after the shootings, a one-day general strike called by the
ANC and PAC received a remarkable response. Between 85% and 95% of
African workers in Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth
heeded the call, as did others in the Vaal Triangle and in up-country
Western Cape towns. Some 50,000 people attended the Langa victims'
funeral that day, and there were riots in Soweto that night. In the following
days pass-burning and unrest spread to East London, Bloemfontein in the
Orange Free State, and a few smaller towns. But the most dramatic scenes
took place in Cape Town, where the stay-away continued. On Wednesday,
March 30, 30,000 Africans marched, "twelve abreast, dressed in their
workingmen's shirts, trousers, and coats," along the highway curving around
Table Mountain to downtown Cape Town. Their leader, Philip Kgosana,
was promised a meeting wjth the Minister of Justice before the crowd
dispersed. (He was arrested when he returned for the interview). Over the
next four days, thousands of Africans tried to march into Durban, as a stay-
away began there, too. During the week of March 28, many South Africans
thought they were witnessing the start of a revolution.
Two weeks later, it was all over. On March 30, government declared
a State of Emergency, which would last five months, and police detained
1,500 leaders of the black opposition. The next day, after the huge Cape
Town march, the authorities cordoned off the townships there to starve out
the general strike. On April 8, the ANC and PAC were banned. In the
days which followed, protest petered out in most centers. Nonetheless, the
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regime's triumph was^ cbstLj& • TJhe d©5?e§tie, .legacy of Sharpeville included
prolonged recession djuffi'to^capitalr flight and loss of business confidence.
International condemnation wasialsoi^despread. South Africa had to leave
the British CommonweaHh;in,196Ji1and the United Nations imposed its first
sanctions against the cdiintiy.; ttoe^iuntary.arrns embargo of 1962.
The killings at SharpeviHetand Langa represented moments when
moral issues focused naniowlyjn Qn<?,spot: they became simulacra, revealing
the violence underlying white domination in Spy.th Africa. The. massacres
demonstrated that the" regime qoilojiger observed:the,rules,of•non-violent
protest. For a morrienburban blacks also jef^§ed .to hp.Id backl Their
expressive outpouring col rage^ancL grief grejw as; the system's' brutality .
seemed unable to coi&ain it.: Lodge's;cpmmeflt,onihe.march of the 30,000
applies to events throughout the pe.riod:.it:;tyas, as mp^i" the result of'the
growing groundswell of political confidenceamong Cape!Town Africans, as
a reaction to the police^cfueltythatfjtnQrning."17?.»•
The large-scale involvement of urban youth in political protest for the
first time was an important faetp.r ^ sustaining the post-Sharpeville
mobilization, and one with particj&lai;; significance for, the future. Task
forces" of tsotsis helped the PMJnenforce-,general ^strikes and steal or
distribute supplies in the Cape^JTown and PWV areas.173 Tens of
thousands more weighed in informally, beating up strike-breakers and police
and joining disturbances. There -.was,-.also an upsurge, in school pupil
protest, with at least 17 incidents reported in: J?,^0-61. Unlike 1940s student
revolts, which were quarrels over food and discipline.in;ri|ral Cape boarding
schools, the outbursts .were political and spread^tp^t^e towns arid the
Transvaal. (Several resulted from South Africa's declaration of a republic
on leaving the Commonwealth on May 31, 1961.)174 jThe mobilization of
tsotsis and pupils pointed to the emergence of a new force, the youth, with
the potential to reshape township politics, , --..:.•..,-,..." ."
' ' ' ' •'•'•• • ' ' . - . • * " • • : • • . • ; • j . "
But after Sharpeville, organized black politics was overshadowed by
the shift of the newly-banned opposition movements to armed resistance.
The armed struggle against apartheid began: pn the night of December lfi;
1961, when the ANC's newly-formed military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe
(The Spear of the Nation," abbreviated MK).launched the first of over
300(?) attacks that would take place over, three years. MK struck agkirist
government offices, power, lines, security forces and prp-goverriment
chiefs.175 The government's headaches worsened mj.9(j2 when Poqo ("We
alone"), the larger, less disciplined armed wing of the;i'AC appeared.
By 1963, however, beefed-up government intelligence services, the
detention of thousands of activists (frequently tortured under interrogation),
and stiffer penalties for political crimes bore fruit, aided by the movements'
own security lapses. When exiled PAC leader Potlako Leballo announced
plans for a Western Cape rising at a press conference in Maseru, Lesotho,
local police raided his office and passed their findings to the South Africans,
resulting in 3,000 arrests, the quashing of the insurrection, and the collapse
of Poqo. MK was dealt a shattering blow when police raided its
headquarters in Rivonia, a northern Johannesburg suburb, picking up almost
its entire High Command, including Walter Sisulu and other top ANC and
SACP leaders. (The ANC's most prominent leader after Luthuli,
Umkhonto commander Nelson Mandela, had been held in August 1962.)
The subsequent "Rivonia trial" of the MK leaders and their imprisonment
for life became a cause celebre. but MK's centralized organization never
recovered from their loss. Within the country the military wings of the
ANC and PAC had been smashed and their organizational networks
reduced to bare threads by 1965.
Why did the exceptional mobilization after Sharpeville not endure?
The decapitation of the ANC and PAC through detention of national,
regional, and eVen many local office-holders reduced the movements to the
mobilized local followings of local elites. Yet the community elites,
schooled in the give and take of patronage politics, were unlikely candidates
to lead a risky revolt. Furthermore, the movement lacked institutional
support in civit .society. There were no politicized bodies to provide
resources, sheltef activists, or absorb leadership networks on a large scale.
(Collective action endured longest these did exist, in the hostels and
homeboy networks of migrants in Cape Town and Durban.) There were
also no sympathetic mass media and few other spaces for communication
with followers, while the narrowness of the public sphere limited the
diffusion and comprehension of complex events and circumstances.
Moreover, neither the ANC nor PAC had a strategy to exploit the crisis or
to function efficiently underground. The ANC's organizational steering
capacity had ahyays been limited, while the PAC's was virtually non-existent.
(Even the PAC's three Cape Town branches had no contact with each other
during the week after March 21.)
At the mass level, the sense of political opportunity which had
flowered briefly"''was crushed by increasing repression, which broke the
movement's momentum. Local networks and identities that had sustained
mobilization were in any case inward-looking, given the weakness of
collective consciousness at a city-wide or country-wide level. This was
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underlined by the absence of a sustained response in most rural areas,
smaller towns, and even cities. The movement was also badly weakened by
the lack of response from the colored community in the Western Cape and
the Indians in Natal, whose support would have been crucial there.-.In sum,
the crisis of 1960 represented the ultimate example of the postwar mode of
political action in black communities ~ while offering a hint of the role
youth could play in defining a new one.
CONCLUSION
The image of postwar black politics presented in this chapter contrasts
in several respects with the received one. Popular accounts of black politics
describe generations of resistance, progressively gathering: force. .Even
scholarly work has cbritpbtited to this impression by, (.treating resistance
politics as the only worthwhile object of study. Yet, as Lodge acknowledges,
"The dramatic quality of postwar African resistance has sometimes led it to
being understood as posing a considerable threat and obstacle to the state's
policies. Certainly this was the way the ANC and its allies were: frequently
pictured in government propaganda, but this should, not be confused with
the actual extent of opposition mobilized by nationalist organizations."176
Nor should it be confused with the full gamut of black political and social
life, in which resistance was only one, relatively limited element.
A fuller understanding of black politics before the mid-1960s would
note the profound ambiguities and contradictions then prevalent. In the
semi-industrialized racial oligarchy which South Africa represented after
World War II, the interplay of public and private power constituted the
foundation of a clientelist state and social order. Most black political
activity took place within voluntary associations and officially-recognized
institutions; it was usually compromise-oriented and accommodationist. This
was associated with an extremely limited public sphere, in the sense of
institutionalized opportunities for the formation of public opinion. The
values and practices of organized black opposition, in particular the African
National Congress (ANC), also bore the stamp of the society in which they
developed, blending patronage, personalism, and populism. The political
culture within which black political actors operated was marked by an
extensively networked, somewhat aloof elite with a guilty desire for
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assimilation into white society. Among the vast, marginalized masses,
political passions were intense but parochial, with a weak sense of a
common national identity and destiny. These were the foundations of the
black politics that Steven Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement
would challenge.
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